Using micro-level public opinion data from the Pew Global Attitudes Project 2005, this study investigates the effect of educational attainment and income on support for democracy in five predominantly Muslim countries: Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey. Holding all else constant and compared to not finishing primary education, this study finds that secondary education and higher education encourage support for democracy in Jordan, Lebanon and Pakistan. The results suggest that support for democracy is a social benefit of education in Jordan, Lebanon, and Pakistan. Regarding income, the results indicate that relative to the poor, those belonging to middle-income groups are more supportive of democracy in Lebanon and Turkey. Curiously, there is no statistical relationship between belonging to the richest groups and supporting democracy.
Introduction
It is widely argued that a democratic regime with regular and fair elections, as well as more civil rights and liberties is better than an authoritarian regime for social welfare and economic growth (Rodrik & Wacziarg, 2005; Sen, 1999) . Whether or not a country embraces a democratic regime depends critically on the democratic attitudes of its people. Given the role of the education system in instilling democratic attitudes, it is not surprising that non-economists have extensively studied the effect of education on peoples' support for democracy (Aristotle, 1932; Chabbott & Ramirez, 2006; Cutright, 1969; Dewey, 1916; Ekehammar, Nilsson, & Sidanius, 1987; Evans & Rose, 2007; Farnen & Meloen, 2000; Inkeles & Smith, 1974; Kamens, 1988; Lipset, 1959; Meyer, 1977) . Though there is debate on the precise ways that education affects democratic attitudes, the overall conclusion is that educational attainment makes people more supportive of democracy, and encourages them to support democratic initiatives through financial contributions, dissent, protests, and votes.
Economists have only recently started examining the effect of education on support for democracy. A key contribution of economic research is the dual focus of education and income on democracy, as illustrated by the cross-country studies. Using cross-country panel data, Boba & Coviello (2007) and Glaeser, Ponzetti & Shleifer (2007) find that education systematically predicts whether a country is a democracy or not. Acemoglu, Robinson, & Yared (2008) examine cross-country panel data and conclude that per-capita incomes have almost no effect on whether a country is a democracy. Ross (2006) uses cross-country data to show that democracies spend more on providing education and health to the middle-income and rich rather than the poor while non-democracies have better records than democracies in providing for the poor; it can therefore be inferred that greater income decreases support for democracy. In contrast, Barro (1999) provides evidence suggesting that higher income encourages support for democracy. This study uses micro-level public opinion data to examine the effect of education and income on support for a democratic form of government (versus a leader with a strong hand) in five predominantly Muslim developing countries: Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey. The effect of education and income on support for democracy in Muslim countries has puzzled researchers. Barro (1999) and Galioun (2004) , for example, suggest that the conventionally positive effect of education and income on democracy may not hold in predominantly Muslim countries. In an early study, Lerner (1950) concludes that the educated and wealthy among ordinary men and women in Arab Muslim countries have more at stake from political outcomes and are therefore willing to adopt extremist political attitudes. For several decades, the Lerner thesis remained unsubstantiated because of a lack of public opinion data from Arab and other Muslim countries.
The tragic events of 9/11 and the Iraq War galvanized efforts on gaining a better understanding of attitudes in Muslim countries, including micro-level research on the effect of educational attainment and income on attitudes towards political extremism. Using the same public opinion data and similar methodology as this study, Krueger (2007) finds that educational attainment and income encourage support for suicide bombing. In reviewing characteristics of Islamic fundamentalists, Goodwin (2006) documents that most fundamentalists are highly educated and come from wealthy backgrounds. Of course, extremist attitudes towards conflict resolution (that is, suicide bombing) are not necessarily indicative of extremist attitudes towards democracy (such as support for an authoritarian leader), and unsubstantiated assertions can only perpetuate problematic stereotypes about ordinary men and women in Muslim countries.
Nonetheless, in the post 9/11 environment, numerous observers and donors maintain reservations about international educational aid to Muslim countries out of concern that the aid is not improving attitudes towards democracy (Novelli & Robertson, 2007; Rizvi, 2003; United States Department of State, 2006) .
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This study makes four contributions. First, if we acknowledge the merits of democracy over alternative political regimes, then this study adds to the scant literature on the social benefits of education in developing countries (Lange & Topel, 2006; McMahon, 2002) . Second, this study contributes to the limited micro-level research on education, income, and democracy in developing countries. As Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson & Yared (2005) and Acemoglu, Robinson, & Yared (2008) note, the existing macro-level research on education, income, and democracy has not been complemented by micro-level research, particularly from Muslim countries. Third, this study's findings have implications pertaining to international relations, as Jamal & Tessler (2008) argue that micro-level research on political attitudes in Muslim countries can lessen problematic stereotyping, in turn improving political tensions between Muslim and Western countries. Finally, this study offers some clues on whether international educational aid for Muslim countries is encouraging support for democracy.
Country Backgrounds
The countries being considered in this study are from different regions of the world, including Southeast Asia (Indonesia), South Asia (Pakistan), the Middle East (Jordan and 1 In particular, there is concern that international aid for education will be directed towards madrassas (that is, religious schools), which in turn will indoctrinate students with undemocratic values. Such concerns on the value of international aid remains, despite growing evidence showing that madrassas comprise of only a tiny share of educational institutions, and that most madrassas are pedagogically and theologically pluralist (Andrabi, Das, Khwaja, & Zajonc, 2007; Bergen & Pandey, 2006; Hefner & Zaman, 2006) . There are also concerns that public schools indoctrinate students with undemocratic values (Lott, 1999 (Krieger, 2001) After gaining its independence from the Dutch in 1950, Indonesia emerged as a parliamentary democracy that supported freedom of expression, freedom of the press, a multiparty system, and reasonably free and fair elections. The struggles of uniting an enormous and ethnically diverse population, however, ensured the roll back of democracy and the emergence of two authoritarian presidents: communist sympathizer Sukarno (1945 -1968 ) and pro-Western Soeharto (1969 . Both were early democratic regimes that restricted press freedom, party formation, and elections while maintaining some basic democratic elements.
Soeharto's technocrats also engineered high economic growth until the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Since Soeharto's downfall, a multiparty system's transition to a partial democracy has been accompanied by demanding institutional reforms, economic instability, and tensions between various ethnic and religious groups. Arguably, the main concern among most observers is the militant group Hizbollah gaining political legitimacy through elections. (Ozkaleli & Ozkaleli, 2007). 4 Of the five countries that are the focus of this study, and all but Lebanon has experienced both democratic rule and authoritarian rule. In both undemocratic and democratic regimes, ordinary men and women have experienced some progress but much turbulence. That a democracy provides better social welfare and economic growth only under certain conditions is consistent with previous research (Torsten & Tabellini, 2006) . Thus, the nature and determinants of the attitudes towards democracy of ordinary men and women in the five Muslim countries are not obvious.
Data and Methodology
A key reason for the dearth of micro-level economic research from developing countries is the lack of person-level data on political attitudes and income. Recently, the Pew Research Center (a non-partisan think-tank based in Washington, DC) began collecting data on public opinion from industrialized as well as developing countries, including several Muslim countries.
Several social scientists have used the Pew Research Center's Pew Global Attitudes Project
(PGAP) data for examining micro-level political attitudes and cite its advantage in income data over the World Values Survey, another widely used survey in social science research (Krueger, 2007 from Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey. Efforts were made to ensure nationally representative samples, but the sample from Pakistan is disproportionately urban.
To measure a respondent's support for democracy, the following PGAP question is used:
"Some feel that we should rely on a democratic form of government to solve our country's problems. Others feel that we should rely on a leader with a strong hand The first few rows of <Insert Table 1 around here>   Table 1 also presents the distribution of attitudes towards democracy by educational attainment and per-capita income quartile. Among respondents with an opinion(i.e., "support democracy" or "strong leader"), the general pattern is that educational attainment is associated with slightly more support for democracy, especially if the respondent has completed primary education (compared to those with below primary education) or secondary education (compared to those with only primary education). In Turkey, however, there is more support for democracy among those with secondary education than those with higher education. Also among those with an opinion, richer respondents (from per-capita income quartiles 3 and 4) are more supportive of democracy than poorer respondents (from per-capita income quartiles 1 and 2); however, there is no clear pattern between per-capita income quartiles 1 and 2, or between income quartiles 3 and 4.
Table 1 also suggests differences among those who have an opinion ("support democracy" or "strong leader") and those who do not ("don't know/didn't respond").
Educational attainment is associated with having an opinion on democracy in each of the countries, which is consistent with worldwide literature on determinants of political attitudes (Krueger, 2007) . There is also no clear pattern between a respondent's per-capita income quartile and having an opinion. This finding is consistent with the conclusions of the classic study by Lerner (1958) of Arab political attitudes: the poor are too busy surviving to follow politics and are therefore more likely to be indifferent, while the rich are more likely to have political attitudes because they have sufficient time and are often involved in politics. Since this study's focus is on support and opposition for democracy, respondents who did not express an opinion are dropped from the remaining analyses.
Given the qualitative nature of public attitudes ("democratic form of government" or "leader with a strong hand"), a binary probit model is adopted. For a respondent in any particular country, the model to explain support for democracy is given by:
where the dependent variable democracy is equal to 1 if the respondent supports democracy, and 0 if the respondent supports a leader with a strong hand. The explanatory variables are
represented by x, and most notably categorical variables for educational attainment and percapita income quartiles, as well as other control variables. represents the coefficient on the constant term, and represent the coefficients for the educational attainment dummies, per-capita income quartile dummies, and other control variables.
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The control variables are the respondent's gender dummy (male), age-cohort dummies (age18_29, age30_49, age50_64, and age_65+), religion dummy (Muslim), marital status dummy (married), number of children in the household (number of children), and regional controls. These controls are consistent with social science research on the determinants of political attitudes. Gender may matter because democracies are considerably better at improving women's rights than authoritarian regimes (Wejnert, 2005) . The age of a respondent may also matter because the nature of civic education and political experiences vary with age-cohorts. The religion of a respondent may matter because some Muslims are concerned that democracy undermines Islamic values (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007; Tessler, 2003 respondents with families are more supportive of a democracy because of the long-run benefits of a democracy (Beaseley, 1953) . Table 2 presents the summary statistics, with means and standard deviations of the dependent and explanatory variables used in the binomial probit regression analysis. The educational attainments of Pakistan's respondents are by far the lowest, with almost half of all respondents not having completed primary education. Turkey's educational attainment is the highest, with over half of all respondents having completed secondary or higher education. The educational attainment of Lebanon's respondents is lower than those of Turkey's but far greater than those of Indonesia, Jordan, and Pakistan.
Results
<Insert Table 2 around here>   Table 3 shows the results of the probit estimations. The reference categories for educational attainment and per-capita income quartile are "below primary" and "quartile 1"
respectively, which are the lowest levels of education and per-capita income.
<Insert Table 3 around here> For Indonesia, none of the coefficients for educational attainment or income are statistically significant, thus indicating that education and income at all levels are weak predictors of attitudes towards democracy. As discussed earlier, one reason for the lack of any results may be respondent confusion about whether Sukarno and Soeharto regimes were democratic or those of a strong leader.
In Jordan, the coefficients for secondary education and higher education dummies are statistically significant and both have a marginal effect of 0.20. This indicates that, holding all else constant, those with secondary and higher education have a 0.20 larger probability of supporting democracy than those with below primary education. The results also imply that there is no difference in support for democracy between those with only a secondary education and those who have higher education in Jordan.
The coefficients for primary education, secondary education, and higher education dummy variables are all statistically significant in Lebanon. Holding all other characteristics constant, respondents with primary education have a 0.12 greater probability of supporting democracy than those who have not completed primary education. Respondents with secondary education have a 0.11 larger probability of supporting democracy, and those with higher education have a 0.16 greater probability of supporting democracy than those without primary education. This indicates that those with higher education are the strongest supporters of democracy in Lebanon. Regarding income, respondents belonging to the third per-capita income quartile have a 0.08 greater probability of supporting democracy than respondents belonging to the poorest income quartile, holding all else constant. This suggests that upper-middle income respondents in Lebanon are more likely to support democracy than the poorest respondents, but the effect of being among the richest is ambiguous.
In Pakistan, the coefficients for secondary education and higher education dummy variables are statistically significant. Holding all else constant and compared to those without primary education, respondents with secondary education have a 0.15 larger probability of supporting democracy. Respondents with higher education also have a 0.15 greater probability, suggesting that there is no difference in support for democracy between respondents with secondary education and those with higher education. None of the coefficients for income quartile dummies are statistically significant. The results suggest that in Pakistan, higher education and per-capita income are weak predictors of attitudes toward democracy.
In Turkey, none of the education dummy coefficients are statistically significant.
According to the PGAP 2005, therefore, educational attainment does not predict attitudes towards democracy in Turkey. Holding all else constant and compared to the first per-capita income quartile respondents, those from the third income quartile have a 0.10 greater probability of supporting democracy. This indicates that upper-middle income respondents are more supportive of democracy than the poorest respondents. There is no statistical evidence that completing higher education or belonging to the richest income group affect support for democracy in Turkey.
Because of the potential correlation between education and income, two separate estimations were conducted as robustness checks: one without income quartile variables, and another without educational attainment dummies. The results are consistent with the previous analysis and are therefore not included.
Though this study has focused on education and income, there are other possible factors that can encourage support for democracy in each of the five countries such as the decline of state-controlled media, growing numbers of local pro-democracy groups, and changing perceptions that democracy does not undermine Islamic values (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007; Ibrahim, 2006) . Arguably, these factors may yield an environment that is conducive to greater education and income, and subsequently more support for democracy. The unavailability of data on these factors suggests that, like the majority of social science research on the determinants of political attitudes reviewed earlier (e.g. Evans & Rose; Jamal & Tessler; Krueger, 2007; Tessler & Robbins, 2007) , the coefficients in this study are biased. Consequently, this study offers suggestive evidence but not necessarily definitive proof on the causal effects of educational attainment and income on attitudes towards democracy in the five countries.
Discussion and Conclusions
This study examined the effect of education and income on support for a democratic form of government (versus a leader with a strong hand) among ordinary men and women in five 
